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introduCtion
In comparing Soviet era and Putin era foreign policies toward Arabia and the 
Gulf, a striking similarity emerges. In both eras, Moscow’s foreign policy has 
been characterized not so much by a grand design but by an opportunistic 
approach that seeks to have good relations simultaneously with both anti-
Western and pro-Western actors, including those bitterly opposed to each other. 
At the heart of Moscow’s approach both then and now has been an effort by 
Moscow to balance between opposing parties and thereby derive benefits from 
both. Moscow’s logic in both eras seems to have been based on the expectation 
that governments and 
other actors will calculate 
that they are better off 
having good relations 
with Moscow despite 
its support for their 
adversaries since Moscow 
might well support those 
adversaries even more 
otherwise.
This paper will show how 
Moscow has often pursued 
this “balancing between 
adversaries” approach in 
Arabia and the Gulf both 
in the Cold War when 
the Soviet Union was 
pursuing a revolutionary foreign policy and in the Putin era when Russia has 
been pursuing a status quo-oriented foreign policy. This will shed light on the 
enduring nature both of the foreign policy goals that Moscow pursues in this 
region and of the means by which it does so. I will argue, though, that Putin 
has been more successful at this approach than the Soviets were, but that it 
still involves important limitations and risks for Moscow.
“This will shed light on 
the enduring nature both 
of the foreign policy 
goals that Moscow 
pursues in this region 
and of the means by 
which it does so...”
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Moscow, of course, has not 
just pursued this balancing 
between adversaries strategy 
in Arabia and the Gulf, but has 
done so in other regions—or 
would certainly like to. Nor is 
Russia the only great power to 
have adopted this approach. 
The question being addressed 
here, though, is how successful 
Moscow has been in pursuing 
this approach in this one key 
region.
I will first describe the similar balancing efforts that Moscow pursued 
(sometimes successfully and sometimes not) during both the Cold War and 
the Putin eras toward the countries of this region: Saudi Arabia; the smaller 
Arab Gulf states; the Yemen(s); and Iraq and Iran. I will then examine the 
broader similarities in Moscow’s foreign policies toward the region during 
both eras, and discuss their strengths and weaknesses then and now.
“...how 
successful 
Moscow has been 
in pursuing this 
approach...”
saudi araBia
Soviet Era 
Moscow first recognized the 
government of Abd al-Aziz Al Sa’ud 
in 1926, seeing him as a fellow ally 
against British imperialism. The 
relationship, though, went dormant 
in 1937-38 when Stalin recalled 
his emissary (a Soviet Muslim) to 
Moscow, had him arrested and then 
executed, and King Abd al-Aziz 
refused to accept a replacement for 
him.1  Later, after both Stalin and Abd 
al-Aziz had passed away, Moscow 
attempted to restore relations on 
several occasions beginning under 
Khrushchev in the mid-1950s, but 
these all proved unsuccessful until 
1990. 
Over the years, Moscow advanced 
numerous arguments to try to 
persuade the Saudis to do so, including 
that the Kremlin and the Kingdom 
were both critical of Israeli policy and 
of American support for the Jewish 
state, and even that Washington 
was more likely to take Saudi Arabia 
seriously if the possibility of Saudi-
Soviet cooperation was real. 
Between the mid-1950s and 1990 
when Saudi-Soviet relations actually 
were restored at the end of the Cold 
War, there were several occasions 
when this goal seemed about to 
be achieved but something always 
happened to prevent it. 
Saudi-Soviet relations were reportedly 
on the brink of being restored when 
in August 1956 King Sa’ud fell out 
with Nasser, whom Soviet support 
for was growing. Similarly, a Saudi-
Soviet rapprochement—possibly 
including Saudi arms purchases 
from Moscow—was on the brink of 
occurring when Arab Nationalist 
revolutionaries overthrew the North 
Yemeni monarchy and initially called 
for revolution throughout the entire 
Arabian Peninsula. For several years, 
the Saudis supported the royalists 
fighting against the Egyptian- and 
Soviet-backed republicans in a civil 
war there. 
In the latter part of the 1970s, Crown 
Prince Fahd appeared willing to allow 
the normalization of Saudi-Soviet 
relations, but the 1977-78 Soviet-
Cuban intervention in the Horn of 
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Africa set back this prospect. It was revived in 1979, but the Soviet intervention 
in Afghanistan that began at the end of 1979 ended it for over a decade.2 
In April 1984, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Sa’ud al-Faysal laid out four 
conditions necessary for the restoration of Saudi-Soviet relations: 1) a 
complete Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan; 2) an end to hostile Soviet 
propaganda against Saudi Arabia; 3) the withdrawal of Soviet and allied forces 
from Ethiopia and South Yemen; and 4) freedom for Muslims to practice their 
religion in the USSR.3  At the time, it appeared that none of these conditions 
would ever be met. But a few short years later with the changes brought in 
under Gorbachev, they all were. Even then, relations between Moscow and 
Riyadh were not restored until September 1990, just after the Iraqi invasion 
of Kuwait. Saddam’s action profoundly threatened the Kingdom.  Not only did 
Moscow refuse to support him (as it had Nasser’s earlier intervention in North 
Yemen), but Soviet leader Gorbachev began supporting UN Security Council 
resolutions aimed at reversing Saddam Hussein’s actions. And so in the face of 
a dire threat to Saudi security that the USSR was siding with the Kingdom on, 
Saudi-Soviet relations were finally restored.4 
What the successive failures of Soviet efforts just to restore diplomatic relations 
with Saudi Arabia showed is that while Moscow genuinely sought improved 
ties with the Kingdom, before 1990 it did not prioritize doing so enough to 
forego supporting the Kingdom’s regional rivals or undertaking actions itself 
that Riyadh found highly threatening. It is not difficult, then, to understand 
why these Soviet efforts failed. Indeed, what seems more surprising is that 
Moscow actually thought it could take actions Riyadh found threatening and 
yet improve relations with the Kingdom anyway. And yet this is exactly what 
Putin has managed to do.
Putin Era 
Despite the restoration of Saudi-Soviet relations in 1990, ties between Moscow 
and Riyadh did not even enjoy the temporary warmth that Russian relations 
with the West experienced in the early 1990s. Indeed, there are Russians who 
even now believe that Saudi Arabia played a large part in bringing about 
the collapse of the Soviet Union through causing a military stalemate for 
Soviet forces in Afghanistan by its aid to the mujahidin, and through gravely 
weakening the petroleum export dependent Soviet economy by ramping up 
Saudi oil production which resulted in a prolonged low oil price environment.5 
In the 1990s and early 2000s, numerous Russian officials accused the Saudis of 
supporting rebels in Chechnya and other Muslim regions of Russia. Immediately 
after the 9/11 attacks in the United States, Putin frequently emphasized how 
fifteen of the nineteen bombers were Saudis, and tried to get Washington to 
view Saudi Arabia as a common 
threat to both the US and Russia as 
a result of the support from sources 
within the Kingdom for Al Qaeda 
and the Chechen rebels.6 
But after the deterioration in 
Russian-American relations that 
followed the Bush Administration’s 
pullout from the 1972 Soviet-
American Anti-Ballistic Missile 
Treaty and the US-led intervention 
in Iraq, Putin reversed course 
and started pursuing improved 
relations with Saudi Arabia against 
what he described as a common 
American threat. 
The visit of Crown Prince Abdallah 
to Moscow in 2003 ushered in a new 
era of friendly relations between 
Russia and Saudi Arabia. Putin 
himself visited Riyadh in 2007 
with a large delegation of Russian 
businessmen seeking Saudi trade 
and investment. 
The Saudis seemed willing 
to oblige, but only if Moscow 
distanced itself from Riyadh’s 
regional rival, Tehran. The Saudi 
theory about Putin’s motivation 
was that he was mainly interested 
in money, and so if Riyadh made 
clear that it did not want Russia 
selling weapons or other sensitive 
items to Iran but also that Riyadh 
was willing to surpass Tehran as a 
trade and investment partner for 
Moscow, Putin would comply with 
Saudi wishes. This expectation, 
though, was inaccurate. Putin 
wanted improved relations with 
the Kingdom, but was not willing to 
give up much, if anything, in terms 
of Russia’s relations with Iran to 
achieve this.7 
Saudi-Russian relations deteriorated 
when the “Arab Spring” spread to 
Syria, and Moscow and Riyadh found 
themselves on opposite sides with 
Russia defending the Assad regime 
while Saudi Arabia (among others) 
supported Sunni Arab opposition 
forces fighting against him. What 
especially bothered Riyadh was 
that Moscow’s actions in Syria were 
enabling Iran to maintain influence 
in that country.8  After having been 
courted by Putin earlier in 2015, 
Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin 
Salman (MBS) initially felt betrayed 
by the initiation of Russia’s direct 
military intervention in Syria that 
began in September 2015 and the 
subsequent weakening of the Syrian 
opposition forces that Riyadh had 
been supporting.9 
Since 2016, though, Saudi-Russian 
relations have improved. This has 
been partly due to Russia joining Saudi 
Arabia and other OPEC members 
in cutting back oil production in 
order to prop up oil prices that had 
fallen as a result of the expansion of 
American shale oil production. This 
was definitely a Russian concession 
to Riyadh, as Moscow had refused 
previous Saudi calls for it to join 
OPEC in cutting back production. 
Another factor leading to improved 
relations has been a change in Saudi 
strategy toward Moscow: instead of 
holding back on trade and investment 
with Russia until it distanced itself 
from Iran, Riyadh has gone ahead 
with increasing these. Especially 
noteworthy has been the recent 
Saudi expression of interest in buying 
S-400 air defense missile systems 
from Russia at a time when Moscow 
has only sold the less sophisticated 
S-300 version to Tehran (and even 
then after much delay).10  
Finally, not only has Riyadh “agreed 
to disagree” with Moscow on Syria 
while cooperating elsewhere, but 
the Saudis seem to have accepted 
Moscow’s logic that if they truly fear 
Iran in Syria, then Riyadh is better 
off if Russian forces are there to 
constrain Iran than if they are not.
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“The Saudis 
seemed willing 
to oblige, 
but only 
if Moscow 
distanced 
itself from 
Riyadh's 
regional rival, 
Tehran...”
smaller araB gulf states
Soviet Era 
The one Arab Gulf state that Moscow 
had good relations with after its 
independence was Kuwait. But not 
at first; indeed, just after Kuwaiti 
independence in 1961, the Soviet 
Union—that then had close ties to the 
anti-Western regime in Iraq, which 
laid claim to Kuwait as rightfully 
belonging to it—twice vetoed Kuwait’s 
application to join the United Nations 
on the grounds that its security 
agreement with the UK meant that 
it was not “really” independent. But 
after a change of regime in Baghdad 
led to a falling out with Moscow, the 
Soviets did recognize Kuwait in 1963 
and allowed it to join the UN. Soviet-
Iraqi relations would later recover, 
and the Kuwaitis were especially 
dismayed in 1973 when Moscow gave 
verbal support to an Iraqi border 
incursion against Kuwait and when 
Soviet-Iraqi military ties increased. 
Kuwait’s reaction to this, however, 
was to court Moscow through seeking 
to buy Soviet arms, and so give the 
Kremlin an incentive to restrain 
Iraq. The first deal took several years 
to negotiate and was smaller than 
initially foreseen, but was finally 
agreed to in 1977. After that, Kuwait 
went on to buy more Soviet arms 
during the 1980s.11  The relationship 
reached new heights in 1987 when 
Moscow accepted Kuwait’s request to 
register some of its oil tankers with 
the Soviet flag (others were registered 
with the American one) in order to 
deter further Iranian attacks against 
them during the Iran-Iraq War.12 
Good relations with Kuwait provided 
several benefits to the USSR. First, 
Kuwait actually paid for the weapons 
and other goods it bought from the 
USSR, unlike so many of Moscow’s 
radical allies. Second, Moscow was 
able to hold out its good relationship 
with Kuwait as an example of how 
other conservative Arab monarchies 
could similarly benefit from relations 
with the Soviet Union. Third, 
Moscow saw Soviet prestige as being 
enhanced through being seen by a 
pro-American government such as 
Kuwait as being able to moderate the 
behavior of a pro-Soviet adversary 
such as Iraq.13  Ultimately, of course, 
the Soviet Union did not succeed 
at this in August 1990 when Iraq 
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invaded Kuwait. Up to this point, though, Moscow benefited from the Kuwaiti 
government courting the USSR through arms purchases and other means in 
the belief that the USSR could and would do this.
Moscow attempted to establish relations with Bahrain, Qatar, and the United 
Arab Emirates when they became independent in 1971, but was largely 
unsuccessful. Bahrain and Qatar refused even to establish diplomatic ties 
while the UAE did agree to do so, but not to exchange embassies. Moscow’s 
vocal support for the South Yemeni backed Popular Front for the Liberation 
of Oman and the Arab Gulf and the Bahrain National Liberation Front was not 
reassuring.14  It was only in the Gorbachev era when Moscow’s foreign policy 
toward them had clearly become non-threatening that the UAE and the USSR 
finally exchanged embassies in 1986-87, and diplomatic ties were established 
between the USSR and Qatar in 1988 and Bahrain in 1990 (when Saudi-Soviet 
ties were restored).15 
The Soviet attitude toward Oman was particularly negative in the 1960s and 
1970s as a result of two interrelated factors: the close ties between Oman 
on the one hand and the UK, US, and the Shah of Iran on the other, and the 
expectation that the South Yemeni-backed Marxist insurgency in Oman 
would succeed. Soviet commentators seemed genuinely shocked when Oman 
(with British, Iranian, and Jordanian military support) defeated what had been 
renamed the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (a title reflecting its 
diminished aspirations vis-à-vis the rest of the Gulf) by 1976. This really did 
seem unusual at a time when Marxist insurgencies were succeeding elsewhere 
during the 1970s. Soviet hopes for the Omani revolution briefly revived after 
the departure of Iranian troops from there in the wake of the 1979 Iranian 
Revolution, but quickly subsided when these proved fruitless.16 Soviet-Omani 
ties were finally established in 1985 in a move that reflected Omani confidence 
that South Yemen was no longer a threat as well as a desire to show a degree of 
diplomatic independence vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia.17 
Putin Era 
Russia has had generally good relations with all the smaller Gulf Arab states 
under Putin. From Moscow’s viewpoint, its best relationship has arguably been 
that with the UAE—as was shown by the signing of a UAE-Russia “Declaration 
of Strategic Partnership” by Putin and Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed 
bin Zayed on 1 June 2018.18  While the UAE regards Iran as a mortal threat and 
is unhappy with Russian support for Tehran, the UAE has still purchased large 
quantities of Russian weapons as well as traded with and invested in Russia.19 
This is an example that Moscow wants others—especially Saudi Arabia—to 
emulate.
the Yemen(s)
Soviet Era 
The Soviet Union was deeply 
involved in the affairs of North 
and South Yemen during the Cold 
War. Moscow had established ties 
to the Kingdom of (North) Yemen 
in 1928 which went dormant in the 
late 1930’s until they were revived 
under Khrushchev in 1955. Moscow 
even sent military assistance to the 
monarchical government,24  but very 
quickly recognized the declaration 
of the Egyptian-backed Yemen Arab 
Republic when it was proclaimed in 
September 1962. From then until 
the withdrawal of Egyptian forces 
from Yemen following the Arab 
defeat in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, 
Moscow provided weaponry and 
logistics support for Nasser’s large-
scale intervention to protect the 
republicans from the Saudi-backed 
royalists.25  Because Moscow saw 
Nasser as its main ally in the Middle 
East and because Cairo supported 
the Nasserist opposition to British 
rule in what would become South 
Yemen (then known as South Arabia), 
Moscow too favored them instead of 
the Marxist opposition there. It was 
only because British forces targeted 
the Nasserists more and Egyptian 
support for them ended with Egypt’s 
withdrawal from the North that the 
Marxists were in position to seize 
power when the UK withdrew from 
the South at the end of 1967.26 
After the Egyptian withdrawal, royalist 
forces surrounded the republicans in 
what became known as the “Siege 
of Sana’a.” The republic, though, 
was saved due to a Soviet airlift and 
also to the royalists falling out with 
one another. But over the course of 
the next few years, Soviet influence 
with the republicans declined as 
they made their peace with Saudi 
Arabia while Moscow focused on 
competing with China for influence 
in Marxist South Yemen. In 1978, the 
leadership struggle in the South was 
won by pro-Soviet leader, Abd al-
Fatah Isma’il, who wanted to “export 
revolution” to neighboring countries. 
He backed the National Democratic 
Front opposition fighting against the 
government in the North, and in 1979 
war ensued between the Saudi/US-
backed North and the Soviet-backed 
South. The US agreed to sell arms 
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Russia does not trade all that much with Bahrain, but values highly its 
relationship with Manama. While Iran has provided verbal (and perhaps other) 
support for opposition forces from the island nation’s Shi’a majority seeking 
to change the policies of Bahrain’s Sunni monarchy, Moscow has expressed 
support for the latter. In doing so, Moscow seems to be trying to set a “good 
example” for the West and the Arab Gulf states: just as Moscow supports the 
legitimate government of Bahrain against its opponents, they should support 
what Moscow constantly refers to as the legitimate government of Syria 
against its.20 
Moscow’s ties with Qatar have been more contentious at times. Like some 
Arab governments, Moscow has seen Qatar as a supporter of Islamist groups, 
including ones from Chechnya earlier and Syria more recently. Russia has also 
seen Qatar’s massive liquefied natural gas exports as undercutting Russian 
gas sales. Yet Moscow has also sought, and received, large-scale investment 
from Qatar. Perhaps as a result of this, Moscow has pursued an even-handed 
approach in the dispute between Qatar on the one hand and Saudi Arabia, the 
UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt on the other. Putin offered to mediate in this dispute, 
but Saudi Arabia and its allies have not shown much interest in this offer from 
Russia (or similar ones from Kuwait and the Trump administration). Like the 
West, Russia genuinely does not wish to choose between the two sides as it 
wants to continue enjoying the advantages of doing business with both.21 
Moscow’s ties with Oman have also been good, though relatively quiet.22  While 
Russian relations with Kuwait have also continued to be good, Kuwait has not 
put as much emphasis on relations with Russia as have Saudi Arabia, the UAE, 
and Qatar.23  After the trauma of being occupied by Saddam Hussein’s forces 
in 1990-91 which Moscow was unable to prevent, Kuwait has relied principally 
on the US and Saudi Arabia for protection.
“Moscow's ties with 
Qatar have been more 
contentious...”
to Saudi Arabia to be transferred to 
North Yemen, but the Saudis (who 
were as fearful of a well-armed North 
Yemen as they were of a well-armed 
South Yemen) proved unwilling to 
actually make the transfer. North 
Yemeni leader ‘Ali Abdallah Salih 
reacted by asking the USSR to provide 
weapons—which Moscow not only 
agreed to but actually delivered in 
late 1979-early 1980. Thus it came to 
be that North Yemen received Soviet 
military support in fighting and 
defeating the Soviet/South Yemeni-
backed NDF insurgency by 1982—and 
Moscow gained influence in non-
Marxist North Yemen while retaining 
it in Marxist South Yemen.27 
This process was aided by Moscow 
when it cooperated with the ouster 
and exile to the USSR of the pro-
Soviet South Yemeni leader, Isma’il, 
who wanted to export South Yemen’s 
revolution, and his replacement 
by ‘Ali Nasir Mohammad, a more 
moderate pro-Soviet leader who 
wanted to improve relations with 
Saudi Arabia, Oman, and later North 
Yemen. Apparently worried that ‘Ali 
Nasir might be too moderate, the 
Soviets allowed Isma’il to return to 
South Yemen in 1985, perhaps for the 
sake of political “balance.” Whatever 
Moscow’s motive, this resulted in 
disaster: in January 1986, a short, 
intense civil war took place in which 
Ismai’l and several of his associates 
were killed, ‘Ali Nasir and some of 
his associates fled to North Yemen, 
and Moscow at first seemed utterly 
confused about whom to support. 
It ended up, though, supporting ‘Ali 
Salim al-Baidh, an Isma’il supporter, 
but the ruling party was greatly 
weakened.28  With Gorbachev’s retreat 
from the Third World and the end of 
Soviet support for South Yemen, al-
Baidh agreed to the unification of 
North and South Yemen in 1990. As I 
learned through my participation in a 
conference sponsored by the Yemeni 
Foreign Ministry in Sana’a in 1992, 
both northerners and southerners 
regretted the downfall of the Soviet 
Union, the end to Soviet military 
and economic assistance, and the 
ability to play Moscow off against 
Washington and Riyadh.29 
(Power was to have been shared 
between Salih and al-Baidh, but the 
former quickly gained the upper hand. 
Al-Baidh and his supporters tried to 
reassert South Yemeni independence 
in 1994, but this effort was defeated 
by Salih in conjunction with Islah, a 
party that groups powerful northern 
tribes with Islamist elements linked 
to the Muslim Brotherhood.)30 
Putin Era 
Moscow did not show much interest 
in Yemen during most of the Putin 
era. Unlike his Soviet predecessors, 
Putin was not interested in providing 
weapons to customers who could not 
pay or engage in economic relations 
where there was little prospect of 
gain for Russia. 
When the Arab Spring came to Yemen 
in 2011, Moscow supported the 
Saudi-backed plan to transfer power 
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from the increasingly beleaguered Salih to his vice president, Abd Rabbuh 
Mansour Hadi. But Salih, who remained in Yemen, soon joined forces with 
his erstwhile adversaries, the Houthis in Yemen’s far north, and drove the 
Hadi government out of Sana’a, forcing it to flee first to Aden and then to 
Riyadh—which launched a military intervention in Yemen in 2015 against the 
Houthis.31 
Iran has supported the Houthis, though the latter are by no means under the 
control of the former. Moscow, by contrast, has continued to recognize the 
Hadi government (as has most of the international community). Yet while 
most countries withdrew their embassies from Sana’a after it was overrun by 
the Houthis, Russia maintained its for quite a while. As with Moscow’s friendly 
ties with the besieged Bahraini monarchy, Moscow’s continued recognition 
of the Hadi government may be intended to set an example of working with 
established, “legitimate” governments facing domestic opposition that it 
wants others to follow with the Assad regime in Syria. On the other hand, 
Houthi delegations have been received in Moscow and enjoyed favorable 
coverage in the Russian media. Doing this might be intended as a message 
to Saudi Arabia that if the Kingdom continues supporting the Assad regime’s 
opponents, Russia could behave similarly in Yemen.32  Still, the Houthis are not 
the only Yemeni oppositionists that Moscow has been talking with. Moscow 
maintained good relations with Salih up until he was killed by the Houthis in 
December 2017 when he was reportedly about to break with them and work 
with the Saudis in order to regain power.33  
Whether intended as such or not, the presence of former South Yemeni 
President ‘Ali Nasir Muhammad at the 2017 and 2018 Valdai Club conferences 
on the Middle East in Moscow was seen as a sign that Russia also looks 
favorably upon the resurgent independence movement in the South. Moscow 
has offered to help mediate a settlement among the warring Yemeni parties, 
but Putin does not seem willing for Russia to become as deeply involved in 
Yemen as it is in Syria.
iraq and iran
Soviet Era 
Unlike the Arab world with which 
Tsarist Russia had only episodic 
contact, Russian-Persian relations 
stretch back for centuries, with Russia 
gaining increasing advantage over 
Iran in the 18th and 19th centuries.34 
Soviet-Iranian relations between 1917 
and 1941 were marked by episodes 
of contention as well as cooperation 
too numerous to discuss here.35  Iran 
became one of the first Cold War 
crises when the Soviet Union, unlike 
Britain, proved unwilling to withdraw 
the forces they had sent to occupy 
Iran after Germany invaded the USSR 
to ensure that Tehran did not ally with 
Berlin. Moscow’s support for Marxist 
secessionists in Iranian Azerbaijan 
did not help improve relations 
either. While this incident became a 
Soviet-American crisis, the Soviets 
withdrew their forces more as a result 
of the Iranian government signing an 
agreement granting oil concessions 
to the USSR which the Iranian 
parliament then refused to ratify 
after the completion of the Soviet 
withdrawal.36  The 1953 episode in 
which the nationalist prime minister, 
Mohammad Mosaddeq (whom 
Washington and London regarded 
as pro-Soviet, but whom Moscow 
actually had little regard for),37  was 
ousted with the help of the British 
and American governments resulted 
in the Shah moving closer to the 
Western camp. Moscow was not at 
all pleased when the pro-Western 
monarchies in both Iran and Iraq 
joined the anti-Soviet Central Treaty 
Organization (CENTO) in 1955.38 
Moscow established diplomatic 
relations with the Kingdom of Iraq 
in 1944, but relations were not close 
due to the monarchy’s strong ties to 
the UK. The 1958 revolution in Iraq, 
though, brought to power an Arab 
nationalist regime in Baghdad that 
saw the West and Israel as its main 
opponents and the USSR as an ally 
against them. But with Moscow’s clear 
favorite Arab Nationalist leader being 
Egypt’s Nasser with whom Baghdad 
was usually at odds, Soviet-Iraqi 
relations did not proceed smoothly. 
There was even a severe downturn in 
them during the Ba’th Party’s brief 
first period in power in 1963. Better 
relations developed after the Ba’th 
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came to power again in 1968, but there were always tensions in them because 
each pursued policies that the other disliked, including the Ba’th regime’s 
violent suppression of the pro-Soviet Iraqi Communist Party and the USSR’s 
establishing close relations and even selling arms to Kuwait, which Baghdad 
claimed rightfully belonged to it.39 
Meanwhile, despite his pro-Western orientation, Moscow managed to establish 
good working relations with the Shah and provided economic assistance to Iran 
in the 1960s and 1970s.40  The downfall of the Shah in 1978-79 gave rise to hope 
in the USSR (and fear in the West) that the demise of his pro-Western regime 
would lead to the rise of a pro-Soviet one—as had been the standard pattern 
when pro-Western Third World regimes collapsed during the Cold War up until 
then. Instead, the Shah was replaced by an Islamic revolutionary regime led 
by Ayatollah Khomeini who was anti-Soviet as well as anti-Western. Soviet-
Iranian relations deteriorated further when the USSR invaded Afghanistan, 
just to the east of Iran, in December 1979, and even further still when Moscow’s 
ally, Saddam Hussein, invaded Iran in September 1980.41  Moscow at first tried 
to distance itself from Saddam’s action in an effort to improve ties to Iran, 
but when the tide of war turned and Iranian forces moved into Iraqi territory, 
the Soviet Union provided significant support to Baghdad.42  But far from this 
making Iraq more subservient to Moscow, Saddam took advantage of Western 
and Arab Gulf fears of Iran to improve relations and receive various forms of 
support from them too.43 
By the time the war ended in August 1988, Baghdad had relatively good 
relations not just with the USSR, but also with the West and the Arab Gulf 
states. But, as noted above, these turned sour when Saddam invaded Kuwait 
two years later. At that point, Gorbachev was not willing to defend Saddam, 
but instead supported (though did not join) the coalition that expelled Iraqi 
forces from Kuwait.44  The end of the Iran-Iraq war combined with the Soviet 
withdrawal from Afghanistan and the death of Khomeini set the stage for 
Gorbachev and then Yeltsin to improve relations with Khomeini’s successors.45
Putin Era 
While Russia was largely inactive in Arabia and the Gulf in the 1990s, 
Russian foreign policy under Yeltsin did pay attention to both Iran and Iraq. 
During the 1990s, Moscow sold arms to Tehran and agreed to complete the 
Bushehr nuclear reactor that the German firm Siemens had begun but ceased 
work on after the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Tehran, though, was not happy 
that Moscow promised the US to limit its military cooperation with Iran in 
the 1995 Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement (named after the American vice 
president and Russian prime minister who signed it) that was supposedly 
cooperation with Iran’s adversaries 
Israel and Saudi Arabia, and Russia’s 
voting in favor of UN Security 
Council sanctions against Iran 
over its nuclear program (Moscow 
argued that it acted to water these 
down, but Tehran wanted Russia to 
veto them outright). 
Russian-Iranian relations have 
grown closer, though, when both 
Moscow and Tehran gave support 
to the Assad regime in suppressing 
its opponents beginning in 2011, 
Russia finally completed the 
Bushehr nuclear reactor in 2012, 
Russia directly intervened in Syria 
beginning in 2015 in support of 
the beleaguered Assad regime and 
its Iranian supporters, and later 
agreed to deliver the S-300s to Iran 
after all. 
Still, a number of issues divide 
Moscow and Tehran, including 
their continued inability to agree 
on how to divide the Caspian, 
Moscow’s close relations with 
Israel and Saudi Arabia (including 
the galling prospect of Moscow 
selling S-400s to Riyadh when it 
has only sold S-300s to Tehran), 
differing approaches to the 
conflicts in Bahrain and Yemen, 
and—now that the battle against 
Assad’s Arab opponents has largely 
been won—differing views about 
the future of Syria.51 
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secret but the general terms of which 
were well known.46  And under the 
direction of long-time Soviet Arabist 
Yevgeny Primakov as Yeltsin’s foreign 
minister and then prime minister, 
Moscow rebuilt its ties with Saddam 
Hussein. Moscow called for the end 
to UN Security Council sanctions 
against Iraq imposed after it invaded 
Kuwait but took advantage of their 
continuation to sign oil agreements 
that were to come into effect after 
their lifting as well as conduct large-
scale sub rosa trade with Baghdad.47 
In 2000, not long after he became 
president, Putin renounced the Gore-
Chernomyrdin agreement and a 
large Russian arms sale to Iran was 
proclaimed. Many saw the emergence 
of a Moscow-Tehran alliance, yet 
relations stalled over continued 
differences over how to divide the 
Caspian Sea (and its petroleum 
riches) after the breakup of the USSR, 
and seemingly endless delays in 
Russian work on the Bushehr nuclear 
reactor. In addition, Moscow feared 
that the reformist Iranian president, 
Khatami, was willing to improve 
relations with Washington at Russia’s 
expense, while Tehran feared that 
Putin was willing to improve relations 
with the US at Iran’s expense.48 
Russian-American relations did 
improve after Putin supported the 
Bush Administration in the wake 
of 9/11, but Putin fell out with the 
US over the Bush Administration’s 
policy toward Iraq. While Putin (like 
many of America’s Western allies) 
expressed opposition to the principle 
of intervention without UN Security 
Council approval, Moscow also 
seemed just as concerned about the 
potential loss of Russian contracts 
Moscow had signed with Baghdad 
after the downfall of Saddam and US 
unwillingness to guarantee that the 
new government would honor them.49 
Yet despite its objections to the US-
led intervention, Moscow cultivated 
good relations with the new 
government of Iraq that the US set 
up. Moscow did not openly compete 
for influence in Baghdad either with 
the US before its 2011 withdrawal or 
with Iran afterward when each was 
the predominant external power 
there. Russian petroleum firms 
have acquired an important stake 
in Iraq, and Baghdad has become a 
major buyer of Russian arms. The 
Shi’a dominated Iraqi government 
views positively the Russian-Iranian 
intervention to prop up the Assad 
regime in Syria, and even provides 
some support for it. Russia (along 
with many other governments) 
also has good relations with the 
Kurdish Regional Government in 
the north where Russia has also 
acquired oil interests without unduly 
antagonizing Baghdad which wants to 
assert its authority over this region.50 
Tensions in Russian-Iranian relations 
persisted into the 2000’s over issues 
such as continued delays in Russia 
completing the Bushehr nuclear 
reactor, Moscow cancelling the sale 
of S-300 air defense missile systems 
under Medvedev, increased Russian 
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Broader Comparisons
In both the Soviet and the Putin 
eras, Moscow’s foreign policy toward 
Arabia and the Gulf has not been 
limited to supporting anti-Western 
governments and movements, but 
has usually sought good relations 
with pro-Western governments as 
well. When there has been tension 
or conflict between regional actors, 
Moscow’s policy in both eras 
has usually been neither to side 
definitively with its anti-Western 
allies against their pro-American 
adversaries nor to remain neutral. 
Instead, Moscow has often sought to 
avoid choosing between adversaries, 
but to cooperate—sometimes even 
militarily—when it can with both 
sides simultaneously. Further, Putin 
has done this more consistently 
than his Soviet predecessors (who 
sometimes did side with one party 
against another, as it did with South 
Yemen and guerrilla allies against 
Oman in the late 1960s and early 
1970s).
Moscow’s success at balancing 
between adversaries, of course, has 
depended on opposing parties within 
the region cooperating with Moscow 
while it is also cooperating with their 
adversaries. But no regional actor 
in Arabia and the Gulf, or any other 
region, likes it when an external 
power supports its adversaries. This 
can result in a regional actor not 
cooperating with Moscow and relying 
on Moscow’s adversaries (principally 
the United States) instead, as was 
seen with Saudi Arabia during 
the Cold War when Moscow’s 
collaboration with the Kingdom’s 
adversaries resulted in its not 
responding favorably to Moscow’s 
overtures but clinging to Washington 
instead. But as was also seen, Moscow 
has managed to cooperate with 
adversaries simultaneously in Arabia 
and the Gulf during both the Soviet 
and Putin eras. And there are reasons 
for why this can happen, as Moscow 
undoubtedly anticipated since it has 
pursued this strategy so often.
Pro-Western governments have 
obviously turned to America and 
the West for support when Moscow 
supports their adversaries, as Saudi 
Arabia and others have done. But 
some have calculated that even 
when receiving support from the 
26 27
US, they are better off cooperating with Moscow also in order to give it an 
incentive to restrain their regional adversaries, or at least not support them 
in their aggressive ambitions. Absent such a friendly relationship with it, they 
often fear, Moscow may have much less incentive to restrain these regional 
adversaries. And a pro-Western government may also hope that having 
friendly relations with Moscow is more likely to cause doubt among their 
anti-Western adversaries about whether Moscow will support or oppose their 
hostile actions against it.
Anti-Western actors, of course, are not at all pleased when Moscow has friendly 
relations with their pro-Western adversaries in the region. But while they may 
be unhappy, they may—as Moscow well understands—have little choice but 
to accept the situation. After all, they are hardly likely to be willing or able to 
turn to the West for arms in response to Moscow selling arms to pro-Western 
governments. Turning to another anti-Western power for support might be 
an option, but there have rarely been any of those during either the Soviet or 
Putin eras that do not also have or seek good relations with the pro-Western 
governments of the region, upon which they have been dependent for oil 
supplies (the one exception was when China supported Yemeni Marxists in 
South Yemen in the late 1960s and early 1970s—a factor that may have led to 
Moscow’s decision not to balance between Aden and Muscat but to support 
the former for fear of losing influence to Beijing). Their best option, both 
they and Moscow may calculate, has been to “grin and bear it” in response to 
Moscow’s friendly ties with pro-Western regimes since they do not really have 
any other place to go.
Moscow, then, has sought to play the role of great power balancer between 
regional antagonists giving both sides a strong incentive to court Moscow for 
support against the other, thereby allowing Moscow to derive benefits from 
each continuously—so long as Moscow can continue this balancing act. Thus, 
Moscow has refused Saudi offers of dropping its arms sales and other forms 
of support for Iran in exchange for far greater economic benefits from Riyadh 
than Tehran can provide since doing so would not allow Moscow to play the 
great power balancing role that it seeks.
Putin, though, has been much more successful at this than the Soviets were. 
This is because in addition to supporting rival governments in the region, 
the Soviets also supported (even if more rhetorically than substantively in 
some cases) the internal opponents of the governments it was simultaneously 
seeking to have good relations with. Further, the monarchies of the region in 
particular had reason to doubt Soviet professions of friendship after Moscow 
quickly embraced the Arab Nationalist officers who ousted the Iraqi monarchy 
The Soviets were optimistic that political change in Arabia and the Gulf (as 
well as the Middle East in general) would benefit them through bringing to 
power Arab Nationalist or even Marxist regimes that would be more amenable 
to Moscow’s influence than whatever they replaced.55  They initially expected 
that the 1979 Iranian Revolution would eventually have this result, and were 
quite disillusioned when it became clear that it would not. Putin, by contrast, is 
highly pessimistic about how political change in this region will affect Russian 
interests, since he sees the downfall of any of the region’s existing authoritarian 
regimes—especially as a result of American-backed democratization efforts 
involving forceful regime change—as leading to chaotic situations in which 
jihadist forces thrive, or even to the rise of a jihadist regime.56 
Yet while Putin’s not supporting the internal opponents of the more stable 
governments in Arabia and the Gulf is undoubtedly reassuring to them, his 
support for their regional rivals is not—so making his ability to get along with 
them all while balancing them against one another a remarkable diplomatic 
accomplishment. And it is certainly possible that the logic of states being 
better off working with Russia despite its close ties to their adversaries than 
not doing so and risking even greater Russian support for them will continue 
to hold. Nevertheless, there are limitations as to how successful this approach 
can be, and there may even be risks of its breaking down. One limitation has 
to do with pro-Western governments of the region: even though they see 
that it is better to work with Moscow despite its aid to their adversaries, they 
are hardly likely to relinquish their ties to America and the West so long as 
these are willing to support them. Indeed, an additional reason for them to 
cooperate with Moscow is to motivate Washington in particular to do more for 
them because it fears losing influence in the region to Russia.
The Gulf’s one avowedly anti-American government, Iran, is obviously not—
as Moscow well knows—willing or able to turn to the US for support against 
Russia. But it does mean that Tehran is constantly wary of Russia, as the 
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in 1958, and even more dramatically 
in 1962 when Moscow’s Egyptian ally, 
Nasser, and Yemeni Arab Nationalist 
officers ousted the North Yemeni 
monarchy with which Moscow had 
friendly enough ties with to have sent 
military advisers to. It appeared that 
Moscow wanted to improve relations 
with the region’s monarchies in 
order to more easily overthrow them. 
Even the Soviets, though, eventually 
recognized by the early 1980s that 
supporting Marxist opposition 
movements that were unable to 
succeed was counterproductive.
Putin, by contrast, has not supported 
anti-government opposition forces 
either in the Arab Gulf monarchies 
or Iran. He has instead emphasized 
how Russia is a firm supporter of 
the status quo in this region, unlike 
the US whose 2003 intervention in 
Iraq and 2011 one in Libya resulted 
in chaos, and whose withdrawal of 
support for Mubarak in Egypt in 
early 2011 was followed by the rise 
of a Muslim Brotherhood leader the 
next year whom many Gulf Arab 
governments saw as a threat. Much 
like the USSR used to support the 
internal opposition to established 
governments in the region during the 
Cold War, it is the United States that 
has done so more recently—thereby 
making Moscow, in the Russian 
account, a more reliable ally to the 
region’s authoritarian governments.52 
Indeed, while Gulf Arabs generally are 
fearful of Iran’s intentions in Syria 
and unhappy with Russia for allying 
with it there, they often favorably 
compare Putin’s steadfast support for 
Assad with America’s lack of support 
for Mubarak.53  Putin, though, has got 
involved with opposing parties inside 
those countries (Iraq and Yemen 
in this region) where governments 
are weak and opposition groups 
control large parts of the country. 
But just as with Putin’s approach to 
the governments of the region, his 
approach to the various forces in 
countries where governments are 
weak is not to side with one group 
against another, but to balance among 
them all (except jihadist groups) and 
thereby give them each an incentive 
to cultivate Moscow.
The fact that Putin is not supporting 
the internal opponents of the region’s 
stronger governments partly explains 
why he has been more successful 
than the Soviets were in having good 
relations with them. As noted earlier, 
while the Soviet Union pursued a 
revolutionary agenda in this region, 
Putin pursues a status quo one—
and so it is not surprising that pro-
Western as well as anti-Western 
governments find Putin a far more 
congenial partner than the Soviets. 
But why has Putin pursued a status 
quo policy in this region? He is not 
doing so everywhere; in Europe in 
particular, he is pursuing a revisionist 
agenda that includes support for 
anti-democratic nationalist parties.54 
This may simply be because unlike 
the Soviets, Putin has no illusion that 
regime change in Arabia and the Gulf 
will serve Moscow’s interests.
28
resolve it. Moscow’s inability to 
bring about a settlement between 
the opposing parties in the Syrian 
civil war after years of trying 
testifies to this. And here, it is not 
just that Moscow cannot get Syrian 
opposition groups to accept the 
Assad regime (even though they 
have been largely defeated), but 
it cannot get the Assad regime to 
make any meaningful concessions 
to the opposition. 
That being the case, it is difficult 
to see how Moscow could get 
American-supported governments 
in the region to make any 
concessions to Iran, or to get a 
defiant Iran that is in a far stronger 
position than Assad to make any 
concessions to them. 
Further, since Putin derives his 
influence in the region from 
endlessly playing off rival forces 
against each other, it is unclear 
that he has the will even if he 
had the ability to resolve conflicts 
between them and thereby reduce 
Russia’s leverage over them. Thus, 
even though Putin has pursued 
a balancing between adversaries 
policy in Arabia and the Gulf 
more successfully than his Soviet 
predecessors, it appears to be the 
only policy—with all its attendant 
limitations and risks—that Putin is 
both willing and able to pursue in 
this region.
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negative Iranian Foreign Ministry reaction to Putin’s May 2018 call for the 
withdrawal of all foreign forces from Syria demonstrated.57  Ironically, the 
Trump Administration’s withdrawal from the Iranian nuclear accord which has 
caused a rift between the US and its European allies may create an opportunity 
for Iran to cooperate with Europe,58  which could reduce Iranian dependence 
on Moscow. And all governments in the region want to cooperate with China. 
For even if, as is likely, Beijing also seeks to avoid choosing sides between 
the region’s rivals but cooperate with them all, China offers one significant 
advantage over Russia: China buys oil from the region while Russia competes 
with the countries there in selling it. And with its much larger economy, China’s 
influence in the region could well dwarf Russia’s if and when Beijing chooses 
to exercise it—especially considering Russia’s own economic dependence on 
China.
But independent of these possibilities, there is one serious risk to Putin’s 
approach. Maintaining balance between adversaries indefinitely is not easy. 
While Putin wants to take advantage of these rivalries to give both sides an 
incentive to court Moscow, he does not really want them to boil over into 
conflict that brings in the US and possibly others in on one side. Yet by 
simultaneously working with Iran on the one hand and the Arab Gulf states (as 
well as with Israel) on the other, Putin may actually contribute to the outbreak 
of just such a conflict which could weaken Russian influence—especially with 
America’s traditional allies in the region if the US strongly supports them 
against Iran while Russia does not.
Moscow, though, seems highly self-confident in its ability to keep on 
balancing between adversaries in Arabia, the Gulf, and the broader Middle 
East indefinitely. Indeed, one of Russia’s most prominent foreign policy 
analysts, Dmitri Trenin, recently wrote, “Russia does not ignore the Middle 
East’s treacherous divides: it knows that falling into them can be fatal. It seeks 
instead to straddle them, forming relationships with opposing parties on the 
basis of overlapping interests. Russia is busy promoting its own interests with 
all its partners, fully aware of those parties’ own interests. To a significant 
degree, it works.”59  But a policy of balancing between adversaries cannot 
be sustained if doing so serves to exacerbate conflict to the point that it 
undermines the balance.
Resolving conflict between adversaries would be one way to minimize, if not 
eliminate, this problem. And indeed, Moscow advertises how its good relations 
with Iran compared to America’s poor ones makes Moscow a better interlocutor 
for the Arab Gulf states in doing so.60  The ability to talk to different sides in 
a conflict, though, does not mean that an external great power can actually 
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